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Organizational Learning and Corporate Diversification Performance 
Abstract 
  This study investigates the role of organizational learning on the valuation effects of 
corporate diversification. The empirical findings suggest that corporate diversification 
reduces shareholders’ wealth. However, consistent with the absorptive capacity viewpoint of 
organizational learning, diversification performance depends on repetitive and accumulative 
experiences that relate to a firm’s prior diversification activity and/or a firm’s experience in 
operating in multiple-business segments. Specifically, single-business firms that diversify 
once demonstrate significant value reduction. In contrast, multi-business firms that diversify 
once do not demonstrate value reduction, while single/multi-business firms that diversify 
multiple times demonstrate material value creation. Findings also reveal that performance is 
conditional on the mode of diversification since internal growth diversification show higher 
valuation effects than diversifications through acquisitions. These findings contribute to the 
literature by affirming the importance of organizational learning, a cognitive and behavioral 
perspective, in explaining the valuation effect of corporate diversification.   
   
Keywords: organizational learning; absorptive capacity; diversification; repetitive 
experience; accumulative experience; diversification discount; firm performance 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A considerable body of academic literature that examines the performance of 
corporate diversification finds that, on average, diversification destroys shareholder value, a 
finding known as the diversification discount (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994). 
However, scholars pay much less attention to the cross sectional variance of corporate 
diversification performance. Identifying factors that make diversification successful for some 
firms but not for other is of great importance for managers, because, this insight provides 
clues on how to best implement a diversification program to enhance performance. This study 
proposes that one such factor is organizational learning. The motivation comes from prior 
evidence that establishes a positive relation between organizational learning and operating 
performance pertaining to strategic decisions, such as mergers, acquisitions, alliances, sell-
offs, and spin-offs (Amburgey and Miner, 1992; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Bergh and 
Lim, 2008).  
This study develops and tests a theoretical model that draws on the absorptive 
capacity viewpoint to relate organizational learning to the valuation effects of corporate 
diversification. Specifically, an organization’s ability to learn from strategic decisions arises 
from the existence of absorptive capacity, which develops when a firm repeats a specific 
corporate action and/or accumulates experience by operating in a certain environment (Bergh 
and Lim, 2008; Zahra and George, 2002). Past relevant experience enables the firm to 
recognize and explicitly codify valuable new knowledge into systems, routines, and 
procedures that guide future actions (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Mayer, Stadler, and Hautz, 
2014). The absorptive capacity viewpoint also assumes that learning performance is greatest 
when the object of learning relates to past knowledge (Bergh and Lim, 2008; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002), which indicates the relevance of resource 
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relatedness. Overall, organizational learning improves subsequent strategic, financial and 
operational decision making (Haleblian, Kim, and Rajagopalan, 2006; Mayer et al., 2014; 
Shaver, Mitchell, and Yeung, 1997), resulting in competitive advantage and higher firm 
performance (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, and Borza, 2000). Figure 1 shows the 
abovementioned theoretical perspective and the testable relations. 
Figure 1 here. 
To empirically investigate the relation between organizational learning and valuation 
effects of corporate diversification, however, one needs to recognize that firms often engage 
in a program of actions as a means of implementing their corporate strategy (Schipper and 
Thompson, 1983). Scholars suggest that corporate actions in a program influence each other, 
and therefore  individual diversification events may not explain adequately the performance 
of corporate programs (Laamanen and Keil, 2008; Barkema and Schijven, 2008b; Shi and 
Prescott, 2011). In this respect, the experience from individual diversifications, including 
failed ones, create valuable learning for firms which can enhance the overall performance of 
a diversification program (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Muehlfeld, Sahib, and 
Witteloostuijn, 2012). To address this issue, this study uses business segment-level data, to 
develop corporate diversification profiles that capture different capacities of repetitive and 
accumulative organizational experiences as an indication of absorptive capacity. This study 
uses  information throughout the entire period of investigation rather than information from 
each individual diversification activity separately, and avoids  mixing together the impact of 
organizational learning capacity during the periods before and after a decision to diversify. 
Specifically, the study defines diversification profiles by classifying diversified firms into 
three categories, depending on both a firm’s prior diversification activity and the firm’s  
experience in operating in a multiple-business structure: (i) single-business firms that 
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diversify once (Single-Business-Once), (ii) multi-business firms that diversify once (Multi-
Business-Once), and (iii) single/multi-business firms that diversify multiple times 
(Single/Multi-Business-Many). Single-Business-Once firms should bear no repetitive and 
accumulative experience resulting to the lowest organizational learning with respect to 
corporate diversification relative to both Multi-Business-Once and Single/Multi-Business-
Many firms, and thus should demonstrate the lowest diversification performance. 
Single/Multi-Business-Many firms should display both repetitive and accumulative 
experience, resulting to the highest organizational learning, and thus, should demonstrate the 
highest diversification performance relative to the other two diversification profiles. Multi-
Business-Once firms should demonstrate only accumulative experience resulting to in-
between organizational learning relative to the other two profiles, and thus, should 
demonstrate higher corporate diversification performance in comparison to Single-Business-
Once firms and lower corporate diversification performance in comparison to Single/Multi-
Business-Many. Further the study assesses learning performance using the mode of 
diversification as an indicator of resource relatedness; internal growth versus acquisition. 
Firms that rely on internal growth to diversify utilize their own organizational resources, and 
therefore, are likely to benefit more from learning since they employ more similar processes, 
systems and organizational culture (Chatterjee, 1990) relative  to acquisitions that don't share 
such organizational resource commonalities (Tanriverdi and Venkatraman, 2005; Xie and 
O’Neil, 2014). As a result, diversifications should demonstrate higher performance when 
firms diversify through internal growth than acquisitions. 
This study contributes to the literature by affirming the importance of organizational 
learning, a cognitive and behavioral perspective, in explaining the valuation effect of 
corporate diversification. Early studies provide evidence that corporate diversification, on 
6 
 
 
average, destroys value (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, 
and Connelly, 2006; Martin and Sayrak, 2003). Instead, this study focuses on the cross 
sectional variance of diversification performance and provides evidence that a firm’s 
diversification profile, which captures different degrees of repetitive and accumulative 
experience, affects value. These findings are important since they contribute to the literature 
that identifies antecedents of corporate diversification performance (Hitt, Hoskisson, and 
Ireland, 1994; Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim, 1997; Tallman and Li, 1996; Qian, 2002; Riahi-
Belkaoui and Picur, 1998). This study is one of the few to adopt an empirical construct that 
considers the firm’s diversification program rather than individual acts of diversification by 
using profiles to capture repetitive and accumulative experience through-out the 
diversification program (Barkema and Schijven, 2008b; Muehlfeld et al., 2012; Shi and 
Prescott, 2011). In addition, the findings have practical implications since they provide 
managers with insights on how to utilize organizational learning to be successful in their 
corporate diversification programs. 
Following this introduction, the next section describes the relevant literature. The 
third section develops the hypotheses, followed by a section outlining the research design. 
The fifth section presents the empirical results. The final section concludes the discussion.  
2. Literature Review  
2.1. Corporate diversification and firm value 
Corporate diversification destroys shareholder wealth, a phenomenon that leads to the 
diversification discount puzzle (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994). Many 
researchers attribute the presence of the diversification discount to agency problems either 
between managers and shareholders (e.g., Amihud and Lev, 1981; Bergh, Johnson and 
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DeWitt, 2008; Hoechle, Schmid, Walter, and Yermack, 2012; Jensen, 1986; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1989; Singh, Nejadmalayeri, and Mathur, 2007) or between corporate headquarters 
and divisional managers (e.g., George and Kabirb, 2008; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). Even 
though agency problems may explain the impact of corporate diversification on firm value, 
the more fundamental economic question of why firms diversify is still difficult to 
rationalize. 
A different strand of the literature, however, challenges the existence of a discount 
(Campa and Kedia, 2002) and thus rationalizes the fact that many firms remain diversified or 
even decide to diversify further. These studies support that the discount is due to 
measurement errors (e.g., Villalonga, 2004; Whited, 2001), due to differences in firm risk 
from the book value bias of corporate debt (e.g., Mansi and Reeb, 2002), and due to failure to 
control for the endogenous nature of the diversification decision (e.g., Campa and Kedia, 
2002; Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf, 2002; Santalo and Becerra, 2008). 
These two strands of literature offer a compelling case as to whether or not corporate 
diversification destroys firm value on average. However, the literature pays much less 
attention to determinants that explain the cross-sectional variation of the diversification 
performance. Evidence of firm factors that make diversification successful for some firms but 
not for others is of great importance for market participants. Along this line, prior literature 
suggests that factors such as product diversification (Hitt et al., 1994; Hitt et al., 1997; 
Tallman and Li, 1996), firm size (Qian, 2002), and investment opportunities (Riahi-Belkaoui 
and Picur, 1998) may be useful in explaining the variation of diversification performance.  
 
2.2. Organizational learning and the absorptive capacity viewpoint 
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The strategic management literature defines organizational learning as a systematic 
change in corporate behavior due to new knowledge the organization generates by sharing 
prior experience  (Levitt and March, 1988; Miner, Bassoff, and Moorman, 2001). Under the 
absorptive capacity learning viewpoint, learning develops when firms are able to recognize 
the value of new knowledge, assimilate and apply knowledge to commercial ends (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). Absorptive capacity is a function of prior organizational experience, and 
develops dynamically when new knowledge enters the organization (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Lane, Salk, and Lyles, 2001; Zahra and George, 2002). When such knowledge relates 
to what the organization already knows, learning performance is highest (Bergh and Lim, 
2008; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002). A firm may develop absorptive 
capacity in the course of repetitive experience which the organization gains from certain 
corporate actions and of accumulative experience which the organization gains from day-to-
day exposure to operations (Bergh et al., 2008).  
Regarding repetitive experience, prior literature suggests that corporate actions enable 
a firm to develop absorptive capacity for understanding that type of action (Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1998; Haleblian et al., 2006), thus improving a firm’s ability to successfully 
implement similar types of actions in the future (i.e., Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). In that 
respect, Amburgey and Miner (1992) discuss the existence of a repetitive momentum that 
occurs when an organization repeats a specific action. In particular, a firm operating over 
time develops absorptive capacity, which the organization codifies into systems, routines, and 
competencies that deepen understanding, enhance proficiency, facilitate future learning, and 
therefore become independent engines for further actions (Haleblian et al., 2006; Hayward, 
2002). 
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Regarding accumulative experience, day-to-day exposure to a firm’s operations 
enables development of absorptive capacity by increasing flexibility and adaptation skills, 
which improves decision making and overcomes traps to knowledge development (Lane and 
Lubatkin, 1998). Accordingly, accumulative experience would translate into explicit 
knowledge about operating procedures, formal systems, and routines (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999), all of which would guide future actions (Haleblian, et al., 2006; Hitt, 
Harrison, Ireland, and Best, 1998). 
2.3. Organizational learning and corporate diversification 
The absorptive capacity viewpoint of organizational learning pertains to corporate 
diversification because diversification provides conditions necessary for the development of 
repetitive and accumulative experience benefits (Mayer et al., 2014). The process of 
corporate diversification, via either internal growth or acquisitions, involves interdependent 
milestone decisions and cooperation with other parties, creating more potential for realizing 
repetitive experience learning (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). More specifically, the 
diversification program involves the management of transaction costs that relate to the 
identification of diversifying investment opportunities, the collection of information 
necessary to evaluate diversification synergies, the appraisal of alternative financing means, 
the exchange of assets with external third-party sellers, and the integration of new operations. 
Each of these steps requires effective decision making, which, in conjunction with the 
complexity that characterize the diversification program, presents the necessity to capture 
learning into codified routines, systems, and standardized procedures (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999). As a result, a firm that pursues repetitive diversifications, gains learning 
from recognizing and assimilating new experiences that emerge from repeating such 
processes (Bergh et al., 2008). 
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Similarly, experience that the organization accumulates by operating in a diversified 
structure fosters the development of absorptive capacity with respect to corporate 
diversification. Specifically, diversified firms manage high complexity by being explicit 
about performance (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). They evaluate performance using profit 
center accounting techniques that focus on observable measures of performance, such as 
market share and/or return on assets (Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson, 1992). Such observable 
measures of performance create more transparency with respect to the factors that influence 
diversification performance and enable managers to focus on key performance levers and use 
related experiences from operations to create a dynamic process of organizational learning 
(Bergh et al., 2008). For example, organizations receive a wide range of performance-related 
information daily, which they process and codify into systems and this helps them to spot 
problems they would have missed otherwise (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). High levels of 
absorptive capacity helps to improve, among other things the firm’s ability to efficiently 
allocate capital between business units, the employment of compensation schemes that 
motivate  performance in  a diversified firm, the development of subtle processes to better 
monitor and coordinate input/output products across business units to improve  performance, 
and finally, their ability to better cope with the competition that confronts different business 
units (Amburgey and Miner, 1992; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991a, b; Pennings, Barkema, and Douma, 1994).  
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
3.1. Organizational learning and corporate diversification performance 
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Following the theoretical framework, learning effects on corporate diversification 
performance should capture both repetitive and accumulative diversification experiences. 
Thus, the study defines diversification profiles by classifying diversified firms into three 
categories, depending on both a firm’s prior diversification activity and experience in 
operating in a multiple-business structure: (i) single-business firms that diversify once 
(Single-Business-Once), (ii) multi-business firms that diversify once (Multi-Business-Once), 
and (iii) single/multi-business firms that diversify multiple times (Single/Multi-Business-
Many). Section 4.1.3 discusses in more detail the development of diversification profiles. 
Single-Business-Once firms lack both repetitive and accumulative diversification 
experience. Specifically, such firms have no experience with diversification activity, and 
therefore, they are more prone to procedural errors, because, the firm's overall organizational 
capabilities lack the specialist knowledge about how to select (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991a,b) or integrate with the existing structure newly established diversified operations 
(Hayward, 2002). Furthermore, these firms expose themselves to financial projection 
inaccuracies since their knowledge on how to assess properly benefits/costs arising from a 
corporate diversification strategy is deficient (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Philips, 1982). In 
this respect, Hitt et al. (1998) propose that without such (organizational) learning, chaotic 
conditions limit control over the implementation processes, leading to poor financial 
performance and a reduction in innovative activity. In addition, Single-Business-Once firms 
have no experience in sharing resources in a diverse business setting to benefit from 
synergies (Hitt et al., 1997). Therefore, these firms are at the lowest level on the learning 
curve when they diversify, since, most likely, do not have adequate coordination and 
communication mechanisms for sharing knowledge between business units. Such 
mechanisms are important because they enhance organizational learning by facilitating 
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transfer of proprietary knowledge and assimilation of this knowledge at different businesses 
so as to increase the firm’s innovation capacity and their ability to extract rents from 
innovation (Szulanski, 1996).  Finally, these firms may lack the capacity to develop 
economically valuable routines and standardized procedures, because, the scope for synergies 
and economies of scale are more scarce for firms operating in a single business. In turn, this 
situation constrains the creation and advancement of knowledge about mechanisms and 
procedures that achieve such economic benefits (Tanriverdi and Venkatraman, 2005). For 
example, the firm may fail to develop appropriate services functions or to disseminate best 
practice, and as a result, they may miss opportunities for reducing operating costs and 
advance more valuable innovations (Mascarenhas, 2012). Therefore, lack of organizational 
learning that relates to repetitive and accumulative diversification experience should have a 
negative effect on the performance of Single-Business-Once firms.      
A positive valuation effect, however, should be true for Single/Multi-Business-Many 
firms since both repetitive and accumulative experience would facilitate the development of 
learning that in turn increases the net benefits of diversification, resulting in a positive effect 
on their diversification performance.  
Finally, Multi-Business-Once firms possess accumulative experience from operating 
in a diversified setting, but, are more likely to be deficient of repetitive experience, therefore, 
their learning, and consequently, their diversification performance should be higher than 
Single-business-once, but, lower than Single/Multi-business-many. The above arguments 
suggest that: 
H1a. Single-Business-Once firms demonstrate the lowest corporate diversification 
performance in comparison to firms belonging to the other two diversification profiles.  
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H1b. Single/Multi-Business-Many firms demonstrate the highest corporate diversification 
performance in comparison to firms belonging to the other two diversification profiles. 
H1c. Multi-Business-Once firms demonstrate higher corporate diversification performance in 
comparison to Single-Business-Once firms and lower corporate diversification performance 
in comparison to Single/Multi-Business-Many. 
3.2. Relatedness of diversification and corporate diversification performance 
The absorptive capacity viewpoint depicts that learning benefits more corporate 
actions that relate to the firm’s stock of knowledge than actions that are distant from the firm 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002). For example, scholars suggest that 
non-core acquisitions increase administrative costs since firms cannot apply their knowledge 
to efficiently integrate these organizations (Aktas, Bodt, and Roll, 2013; Barkema and 
Schijven, 2008b; Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; Hayward, 2002). Consequently, 
relatedness between the existing corporate structure and diversifications should make a 
corporate diversification program more valuable (Tanriverdi and Venkatraman, 2005).  
Previous studies suggest that relatedness associates with the mode of diversification, 
namely internal growth or acquisitions. Early research suggests that lower barriers of entry 
and greater relatedness associate with internal growth expansions rather than acquisitions 
(Yip, 1982). The link between relatedness and mode of expansion, however, depends on 
whether the firm seeks to deepen or extend resources (Lee and Lieberman, 2010). Usually, a 
firm’s management utilizes acquisitions within the firm’s primary business domain to deepen 
resources, while management  utilizes those outside the primary business domain to extent 
resources (Karim and Mitchell, 2000). As a result, whenever acquisitions concentrate in close 
proximity to the firm’s resources, the relation between relatedness and mode of expansion 
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need not hold. In contrast, when acquisitions concentrate away from the firm’s resources the 
relation between relatedness and mode of expansion holds (Lee and Lieberman, 2010). 
Accordingly, the absorptive capacity viewpoint suggests that the mode of 
diversification affects firm value. More specifically, internal growth diversification follows 
an incremental process utilizing firm resources which warrants proximity of operations 
(Pennings et al., 1994). As a result, the knowledge the firm requires to implement internal 
growth, which among other involves new product launch, staffing and partner agreements, 
should reside within the firm, whether they pursue their first diversification or one of many, 
due to the relatedness to the organization’s resources. In addition, with internal growth 
diversification a firm may apply learning to proximate activities and resources from existing 
knowledge and operational structures residing in the firm’s  intimate environment. As such, 
the firm could benefit among other things from, economies of scale and scope, relations 
between product units and geographic areas, and sharing core competences across functions 
(Kogut, 1985; Markides and Williamson, 1994).  
In contrast, applying learning to diversification through acquisitions is more difficult. 
For instance, the resource commonality with the firm is lower than to internal growth, since 
acquisitions have different systems that make integration more difficult (Lane and Lubatkin, 
1998). In addition, each acquisition is quite different from other acquisitions due to different 
processes, systems and cultures, which may constrain the firm’s ability to efficiently codify 
implementation knowledge into standard routine procedures for pursuing future acquisitions 
(Laamanen and Keil, 2008). Therefore, acquisitions may limit the learning benefits of 
repetitive experience and the subsequent positive impact on performance from 
standardization, synergies and risk reduction in subsequent decisions and implementations 
(Barkema and Schijven, 2008b). Along this line, Hayward (2002) finds evidence that 
15 
 
 
dissimilarity of prior acquisitions has negative effect on firm performance and concludes that 
acquiring dissimilar businesses prevents specialized learning about any new business, and 
adds to administrative costs. Similarly, Laamanen and Keil (2008) argue that differences in 
processes, systems and organizational cultures constrain the application of past experiences to 
extract synergies from resource extending acquisitions. To benefit from learning, the firm 
may need to understand how the target firm operates and find common resources to build 
sufficient organizational fit (Pablo, 1994). This however is an arduous task because of 
inefficient communication and different practices and systems (Szulanski, 1996). As a result, 
this complexity may compromise the benefits from synergies and economies of scale and 
hamper this way firm performance. In corroboration, Porter (1987) also finds that firms 
divest the majority of their acquisitions in non-core industries, and attribute this result to the 
difficulty to integrate specialized resources and gain synergies since the acquirers’ knowledge 
diverge from that of the acquired firm.  The above discussion suggests that: 
H2. Firms demonstrate higher performance when they diversify through internal growth than 
acquisitions. 
4. Research Design 
4.1 Definitions and measurement of variables 
This section provides information about definitions, variables measurement and 
databases that the study utilizes. Table 1 displays essential information relating to discussions 
that follow in the subsequent sections. 
Table 1 here. 
4.1.1 Measuring the performance of corporate diversification 
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To investigate whether diversification destroys corporate value or not, this study relies 
on the excess value (EXC_VAL) measure of Berger and Ofek (1995). Excess value compares 
a firm’s market value to the firm’s imputed value, assuming that each of the business 
segments operate as a single-business firm. Market value is the sum of the market value of 
equity (equal to the stock price at the fiscal year-end multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding) and the book value of debt. The imputed value is the sum of the firm’s segments 
imputed values, obtained by multiplying each segment’s sales with the median of the market 
value-to-sales ratio computed using only single-business firms in the same industry. The 
industry definition follows the narrowest Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) grouping 
that includes at least five single-business firms and sufficient data for computing the ratios. 
Excess value is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the firm’s market value to the imputed 
value and measures the gain or loss from corporate diversification. 
4.1.2 Defining corporate diversification  
The study defines corporate diversification at the cross-sectional level using a dummy 
variable that equals one for each year the firm operates in multiple business segments and 
zero otherwise (DCY). Further, to alleviate potential endogeneity or measurement error 
problems (a detailed discussion of these issues exist in section 5.3), the study identifies 
diversified corporations using a dummy variable that equals one during the sample period if a 
firm diversified at least once during the sample period and zero otherwise (DC). The study 
also distinguishes the time periods before and after the first instance of diversification. 
Specifically, a “Before” diversification dummy equals one for the years before a firm 
diversifies for the first time and zero otherwise; an “After” diversification dummy equals one 
for all years following the first instance of diversification and zero otherwise. The 
econometric approach then interacts the “Before” and “After” dummies with DC to form two 
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new dummy variables, namely “Before DC” and “After DC”. For illustration purposes, if, for 
example, a firm diversifies several times, “After DC” would then equal one for the year the 
first diversification occurs and thereafter and zero otherwise. Similarly, “Before DC” would 
equal one for the years prior to the first diversification and zero otherwise. 
4.1.3 Defining diversification profiles  
This study defines diversification profiles by classifying diversified firms into three 
categories, depending on both a firm’s prior diversification activity and the firm’s  experience 
in operating in a multiple-business structure: (i) single-business firms that diversify once 
(Single-Business-Once, SBO), (ii) multi-business firms that diversify once (Multi-Business-
Once, MBO), and (iii) single/multi-business firms that diversify multiple times (Single/Multi-
Business-Many, SMBM). This definition, avoids intermingling the impact of learning on 
diversification performance during the periods before and after the decision to diversify. For 
instance, assume for demonstration purposes that a firm diversifies three times into new 
business units. In that case, for the period between the second and third diversification events, 
the firm’s excess value should reflect, among other things, repetitive learning arising from the 
first and second diversification events and accumulative learning arising from the day-to-day 
exposure to multi-business operations following the first diversification event. As a result, a 
cross-sectional handling procedure that analyzes individual diversification events would only 
compare firm value before and after the third diversification event. Yet, such handling is not 
sufficient to make a meaningful assessment of the impact of organizational learning on 
diversification performance. In contrast, to guard against such erroneous inferences, the 
approach in this study utilizes a time-series analysis of each firm’s diversification profile 
which involves the full history of the firm’s diversification activity.  
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Finally, in a similar fashion, the econometric approach also interacts the “Before” and 
“After” diversification dummies with the profile variables, namely SBO, MBO and SMBM, 
to distinguish the periods before and after the first incidence of diversification per profile. 
4.1.4 Measuring corporate diversification relatedness 
This study measures relatedness of diversification with the mode of diversification, 
namely internal growth or acquisition. Internal growth diversification utilizes firm resources, 
which warrants proximity of operations (Pennings et al., 1994). In contrast, acquisitions 
which are the means of extending resources to pursue diversification have less resource 
commonality. A diversification is the outcome of an acquisition (ACQ) when the firm 
engages into an acquisition which coincides with an increase in the number of the firm’s 
business segments and sales increase by at least 5%. In all other cases, this study defines an 
increase in the firm’s business segments as a diversification that is the outcome of internal 
growth (No ACQ). 
4.2. Sample selection 
The sample covers all firms in both the Compustat Industrial Segment and Compustat 
Industrial Annual databases during the period 1998–2008. In 1998, the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards (SFAS) 131 superseded SFAS 14, which had been criticized for 
inconsistent segment definitions and segment underreporting (Villalonga, 2004). SFAS 131 
addresses these caveats and, generally, business segment data are more precise from 1998 
and onwards (Berger and Hann, 2003). Therefore, the sample period of this study is 
homogeneous with respect to the accounting standard that governs the reporting of business 
segment data. 
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In the same spirit as in the work of Berger and Ofek (1995), Campa and Kedia (2002), 
Graham et al. (2002), and Santalo and Becerra (2008), the analysis excludes the following 
firm–year observations: firms which report segments in the financial sector (SIC 6000–6999), 
sales which are less than $20 million, observations for which the firm’s market value are 
missing; and finally, sum of segment sales is not within 1% of the firm’s total sales. 
Furthermore, following Andreou, Doukas, Koursaros and Louca (2014), the study eliminates 
firm–year observations for those firms that do not report 4-digit SIC codes for their entire 
business segment when associate with a non-zero sales figure, while the study retains firm–
year observations when associate with a zero sales figure (because these cases do not affect 
the computation of the imputed value and allow more firm–year observations to enter into the 
estimation of the models). Such zero sale figures may arise from managerial discretion in 
reporting segment sales and the subsequent restatement of firm financial results. Finally, the 
study also excludes firm–year observations with extreme excess values (i.e., following Berger 
and Ofek, 1995) or missing values for any of the main control variables.  
The sample includes 8,028 firms and 39,134 observations, of which 4,222 (19,398) 
are single-business and 3,806 (19,736) multi-business firms (observations). Using this 
sample, a subsequent section of the study replicates the analysis of Berger and Ofek (1995) 
and Campa and Kedia (2002) to preclude the possibility that differences in sample periods or 
methodology affect the findings (e.g., regarding the existence of a diversification discount in 
the cross-section of the sample data).  
Then, to investigate the hypotheses the study utilizes a sample, which excludes all 
firms that refocus at any time in the period of investigation, particularly those that refocus 
once from multiple to a single business segment, those that refocus once from multiple to 
multiple segments, and those that refocus multiple times. This restriction is imperative to 
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avoid confounding effects arising from the increases in valuation that firms usually 
experience upon refocusing (Berger and Ofek, 1996; John and Ofek, 1995). In this case, the 
final sample includes 5,680 firms and 25,996 observations, of which 4,222 (19,398) are 
single-business and 1,458 (6,598) multi-business firms (observations). All previous figures 
refer to sample sizes after eliminating missing values for the control variables. 
4.3. Descriptive statistics 
4.3.1. Distribution of firms by diversification profile 
Table 2 reports the distribution of firms by diversification profile during the period 
1998-2008. Out of the 5,680 firms (25,996 firm-year observations), a total of 1,168 firms 
diversify (5,803 firm-year observations), of which, 565 firms (2,637 firm–years) do so once 
from single to multiple business segments (Single-Business-Once), 313 firms (1,535 firm–
years) do so once from multiple to multiple segments (Multi-Business-Once), and 290 firms 
(1,631 firm–years) diversify multiple times (Single/Multi-Business-Many). The remaining 
4,512 firms (20,193 firm–year observations) are either single-business firms or multi-
business firms that do not diversify during the sample period.   
Table 2 here. 
4.3.2. Summary statistics by diversification profile 
Table 3 compares the characteristics of diversified firms before the first incidence of 
diversification with single-business segment firms. Campa and Kedia (2002), argue that firm-
specific characteristics may relate to the decision to diversify and particularly to the 
benefits/costs that arise from diversification activity. Thus, potential differences in firm 
characteristics across diversification profiles may indicate that some firms calibrate the 
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benefits/costs at a diversification profile level rather than at the level of each individual 
diversification event. This reasoning is consistent with the view that each individual 
diversification contains an option to expand in due time, should prior experience/knowledge 
(i.e., capacity for organizational learning) and/or environmental conditions be favorable 
sometime in the future (Trigeorgis, 1996). Therefore, a proper evaluation of the impact of 
corporate diversification on firm value should account for firm characteristics (Campa and 
Kedia, 2002), as well as the firm’s diversification profile, bridging this way a gap in the 
literature. 
Following prior literature (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995; Campa and Kedia, 2002), 
Table 3 reports information on firm total assets (TA), sales turnover (SALES), investments 
(CAPX/SALES), profitability (EBIT/SALES), and leverage (LEV) before diversification. In 
comparison to single-business segment firms, diversified firms are generally bigger, with 
higher sales and profitability. With regard to investments, firms that diversify once from one 
to multiple business segments (Single-Business-Once) and firms that diversify once from 
multiple to multiple business segments (Multi-Business-Once) invest less than single-
business segment firms. In contrast, judging by median values, firms that diversify multiple 
times (Single/Multi-Business-Many) invest more than single-business segment firms, 
consistent with a strategy to expand business scope through diversification. In addition, 
diversified firms’ reliance on leverage varies per profile relative to single-business segment 
firms.  
In summary, prior to the first incidence of diversification, firms’ characteristics across 
the diversification profiles differ relative to the characteristics of single-business firms and 
motivate the use of diversification profiles when evaluating the valuation effects of corporate 
diversification.  
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Table 3 here. 
5. Empirical Results 
In this section the study provides evidence: (i) that diversification profiles capture 
different capacity of organizational learning, (ii) of the existence of a diversification discount 
in the sample period, (iii) that corporate diversification profiles are important to understand 
the cross-sectional variance of corporate diversification performance, and (iv) that results are 
robust to alternative model specifications following the inclusion of additional control 
variables.  
5.1. Diversification profiles and organizational learning 
This section examines whether corporate diversification profiles capture different 
capacities of organizational learning by focusing on the characteristics of acquisitions made 
by firms in each diversification profile. Specifically, prior literature suggests that the transfer 
of an organization’s acquisition experience to subsequent acquisitions is critical for the 
success of the acquisition (Barkema and Schijven, 2008b; Dikova, Sahib, and van 
Witteloostuijn, 2010; Lei, Hitt, and Bettis, 1996). This literature supports the notion that the 
presence of greater organizational learning relates in a positive fashion to more acquisitions 
completed, fewer acquisitions withdrawn, shorter acquisition duration (i.e., fewer days to 
completion), and, more successful acquisitions. Accordingly, if the diversification profiles 
reflect the presence of different capacities for organizational learning, then the characteristics 
of acquisitions should vary across diversification profiles. 
To investigate this claim, the study uses all the firm–year observations after the first 
diversification decision, which the study claims to reflect absorptive capacity, and thus 
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organizational learning coming from repetitive and accumulative experience. For these firm–
year observations, the study uses the Securities Data Corporation database to gather 
information about completed and withdrawn acquisitions. Completed acquisitions are those 
with a specific date in the database to show when each acquisition became effective (i.e., 
target firm becomes part of the business structure of the focal firm), whereas withdrawn 
acquisitions are those with a specific date to show when the acquiring firm had withdrawn the 
offer to acquire the target firm.  
Then, the study separates this sample into the two sub-samples of completed and 
withdrawn acquisitions, respectively. For the sub-sample of completed acquisitions, the study 
further focuses on acquisitions that have  the following characteristics: (i) acquirer firm sales 
increase by at least 5% during the completion year, that is, the acquisition is essential in 
altering the firm's diversification structure, and (ii) the year of completion of the acquisition 
coincides with an increase in the number of acquirer business segments, that is, the year of 
completion affects the structure of each diversification profile and thus shows organizational 
learning with respect to the corporate diversification program. The study, using these 
acquisitions reports information across each diversification profile about the average number 
of completed acquisitions, the average acquisition duration till completion, and, market 
reactions to acquisition announcements. Furthermore, the study uses the sub-sample of 
withdrawn acquisitions to report information across each profile about the average number of 
withdrawn acquisitions. Overall, 34% of Single-Business-Once, 36% of Multi-Business-Once 
and 42% of Single/Multi-Business-Many firm-year observations involve acquisitions.   
Table 4 reports the results. On average, each firm that diversifies multiple times 
(Singe/Multi-Business-Many) conducts 1.63 acquisitions. In contrast, each firm that 
diversifies once from multiple to multiple segments (Multi-Business-Once) and each firm 
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that diversifies once from single to multiple segments (Single-Business-Once) conduct only 
0.76 and 0.24 deals, respectively. In addition, 62.30% of the Single-Business-Once firms 
withdraw the acquisition they initiate, while Multi-Business-Once and Singe/Multi-Business-
Many firms withdraw only 52.50% and 9.90%, respectively. These findings are consistent 
with the view that firms that show greater organizational learning, such as firms that diversify 
multiple times (Singe/Multi-Business-Many), complete more acquisitions and withdraw their 
offers less often. 
The results also show that the average acquisition duration till completion for Single-
Business-Once firms is 90.75 days, 54.16 days for Multi-Business-Once firms and only 40.53 
days for Singe/Multi-Business-Many firms. These results are consistent with the view that 
organizational learning shortens the completion duration of acquisitions. 
Finally, market reaction to the announcements of acquisitions as measured by 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during the three-day period surrounding the deal for 
Single-Business-Once firms is -0.04%, -0.07% for Multi-Business-Once firms and 1.65% for 
Singe/Multi-Business-Many firms. These findings support the view that organizational 
learning that relates to each diversification profile, affects the way the market perceives 
acquisitions. 
In essence, the empirical evidence from this analysis lends credence to the construct 
and quantification of corporate diversification profiles and suggests that diversification 
profiles capture different capacities of organizational learning.  
Table 4 here. 
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5.2. Documenting the diversification discount 
This section replicates the analysis of Berger and Ofek (1995) and Campa and Kedia 
(2002), using cross-sectional data to check for the presence of a diversification discount in 
the segment-level data. This approach ensures that the findings of the current study regarding 
the relation between organizational learning and corporate diversification performance are 
not due to differences in sample periods or methodology. 
Table 5, Panel A tabulates Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients below (above) 
the diagonal between the excess value (EXC_VAL) and the main variables, namely, a 
dummy variable that equals one for each year the firm operates in multiple business segments 
and zero otherwise (DCY), firm size (log of total assets, SIZE), profitability (earnings before 
interest and taxes over sales, EBIT/SALES), and investments (capital expenditures over sales, 
CAPX/SALES). The main observation is the strong negative correlation between the excess 
value and the diversification dummy which indicates the presence of a diversification 
discount in the segment-level data. Table 5, Panel B reports the coefficient estimates of 
pooled ordinary least squares regressions to investigate the presence of the diversification 
discount using multivariate analysis. The control variable coefficient estimates in regression 
model (1) are consistent with prior literature (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995; Campa and Kedia, 
2002). Firm size and profitability relate in a positive fashion to excess value, while 
investment is not statistically indistinguishable different from zero. Turning to the coefficient 
of interest, consistent with prior literature’s findings, the diversification dummy (DCY) 
shows a discount equal to -8.5% (p-value < 0.01), indicating that diversification is on average 
a value-destructive corporate strategy. 
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Next, the study examines the robustness of the discount’s presence to the inclusion of 
additional control variables as in Campa and Kedia (2002). Regression model (2) reports 
estimates of the discount after controlling for lagged measures of firm profitability (lag1 and 
lag2 of EBIT/SALES), investments (lag1 and lag2 of CAPX/SALES), and firm size (lag1 and 
lag2 of Log TA). The model also includes the ratio of long-term debt to total assets (LEV) 
and a squared term of firm size (SIZE-SQ) to control for the potential non-linear effects of 
firm size. 
The findings demonstrate that in comparison to single-business companies, firms with 
high past investments experience higher valuations, though the coefficients are only 
marginally significant (p-value < 0.10). In addition, past profitability does not lead to higher 
market valuations. Similarly, the coefficient of long-term debt to total assets is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. Finally, the coefficient of the squared firm size is negative (p-
value < 0.01), consistent with a diminishing effect of firm size on excess value as firm size 
increases. Turning to the coefficient of interest, the estimated value for the diversification 
discount dummy (DCY) is -8.0% (p-value < 0.01) still indicative for the presence of a 
diversification discount. 
Regression models (3) and (4) report similar regression estimates but after excluding 
all firm–year observations of the firms that refocus during the period of investigation. Prior 
studies document that refocusing affects corporate value and therefore including these firms 
in the sample may introduce bias into the parameter estimates. Using this sample, the results 
show that the discount remains highly significant and ranges between -7.7% (p-value < 0.01) 
and -6.8% (p-value < 0.01), depending on the control variables included in the regression. 
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Summarizing, as in Berger and Ofek (1995) and Campa and Kedia (2002), the 
diversification discount is prevalent in this study’s sample period and is robust to the 
inclusion of additional control variables, as well as to the exclusion of refocusing firms. 
Table 5 here. 
5.3. Diversification profiles and corporate diversification performance 
This study aims to investigate the impact of organizational learning on corporate 
diversification performance. A proper evaluation, however, should first consider the 
endogenous nature of the diversification decision (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Kuppuswamy 
and Villalonga, 2012). Specifically, observing in the cross-section that diversified firm–years 
show lower excess value in comparison to single-business firm–years does not necessarily 
imply that diversification destroys value since, at the same time,  firms with lower excess 
value are more likely to diversify relative to firms with higher excess value; this finding may 
instead reflect the pre-diversification lower excess value of diversified firms. In addition, a 
proper evaluation approach should mitigate any methodological problems that could arise 
during the estimation of the excess value measure (e.g., Mansi and Reeb, 2002; Santalo and 
Becerra, 2008; Whited, 2001). 
To address such concerns, this study follows Andreou et al. (2014) to adopt a time-
series approach that allows comparisons of excess value before and after the first incidence of 
diversification (i.e., the decision to diversify for the first time), reducing, in this respect, 
endogeneity concerns. In addition, a time-series approach decreases the likelihood of biased 
findings due to methodological problems that can arise during the estimation of the excess 
value, since any methodological issues should affect excess value measures similarly both 
before and after the decision to diversify. 
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Table 6 reports regression estimates of the relation between diversification profiles 
and performance. All regressions include year dummies and standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level. Petersen (2009) suggests that this estimation procedure controls 
for potential bias in the estimates of standard errors when residuals are correlated across time 
and/or across firm–year observations. The dependent variable in all model specifications is 
always the firm’s excess value (EXC_VAL). Regression models (1), (2), (4) and (5) relate to 
testing the first set of hypotheses (H1a, H1b and H1c), while models (3) and (6) relate to 
testing the second hypothesis (H2). 
In regression model (1) the main independent variable is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the firms diversifies, and zero otherwise (DC). Control variables are similar to the ones 
included in Table 5 following prior literature (Campa and Kedia, 2002) with the addition of a 
dummy variable to capture the group of diversified firms that maintain a constant number of 
business segments throughout the period of investigation. Note that some of the control 
variables, such as firm size, may diminish the effect of organizational learning on 
diversification performance. Pennings et al. (1994), for instance, suggest that size is a time-
variant effect that captures a considerable chunk of organizational learning. Thus, finding no 
differences in performance across diversification profiles does not necessarily represent 
evidence against the effect of organizational learning on diversification performance. 
Consequently, this type of analysis is rather conservative. 
Regression model (1) in Table 6 shows that firms that decide to diversify any time 
during the sample period trade at a discount of -4.0% (p-value < 0.05). The latter finding, 
however, does not necessarily imply that diversification destroys firm value. Firms that 
diversify their operations may have lower firm value in comparison to single-business firms 
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before diversification. Thus, this type of analysis is not informative enough when examining 
the valuation effects pertaining to the diversification decision. 
To address the former issue, regression model (2) examines whether firm value 
decreases after diversification. Specifically, the model interacts DC with a Before 
diversification dummy that equals one for the years before a firm diversifies for the first time 
and zero otherwise (Before DC). The model also interacts DC with an After diversification 
dummy that equals one for all years following the first instance of diversification and zero 
otherwise (After DC). For all firms that diversify, the diversification year is set to be the first 
incidence of diversification. For example, in this setting, if a firm diversifies several times, 
After DC equals one for the year the first diversification occurs and thereafter and zero 
otherwise. Similarly, Before DC equals one for the years prior to the first diversification and 
zero otherwise. 
Both the Before diversification and After diversification dummies are equal to zero 
for single-business segment firms (i.e., the benchmark firm–years). If diversification destroys 
firm value, then the coefficient of After DC should be significantly lower than that of Before 
DC. Note that endogeneity issues do not hamper this type of setting; yet, as in previous 
studies, such an approach still ignores the impact of different diversification profiles on firm 
performance which this study theorize to be important on the valuation effect relating to 
corporate diversification. 
Table 6 here. 
The results from regression model (2) in Table 6 show that diversification indeed 
destroys firm value. Diversified firms trade at a statistically insignificant premium of 1.4% 
before diversification but at a discount of -7.7% (p-value < 0.01) after the first diversification 
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year. The lower part of Table 6 tabulates a robust t-statistic that compares the performance of 
diversification before and after the first diversification event (i.e., row (I): “Before DC – 
After DC”). The results show that the difference between the after and before diversification 
excess values is -9.2% (p-value < 0.01).  
Next, this study examines the impact of diversification profiles on performance. 
Regression model (4) decomposes the impact of diversification on firm value across firms 
with different diversification profiles. Likewise, the model specification interacts each 
diversification profile with a series of Before and After diversification dummy variables. 
Regression model (5) performs a similar analysis but the model includes two lags of firm 
excess value (lag1 and lag2 excess value) to control for unobserved firm characteristics that 
may affect the diversification decision. Ahn (2009) finds that the excess value has predictive 
power on the survival of the diversification profile (i.e., the lower the excess value, the higher 
the likelihood of refocusing). Thus, if lagged excess value is an instrument that encapsulates 
information on unobserved characteristics, then including lagged excess value in the model 
specification should control for any residual endogeneity bias that resides in the 
diversification decision. 
Regression models (4) and (5) show that diversification destroys value when firms 
diversify once from one to multiple business segments (Singe-Business-Once, SBO). In 
contrast, no such value destruction happens for firms that diversify once from multiple to 
multiple business segments (Multi-Business-Once, MBO) or, for firms that diversify multiple 
times (Single/Multi-Business-Many, SMBM). Assessing the overall evidence of regression 
model (5) from the lower part of Table 6 provides collective support to hypotheses. 
Specifically, row (IV): “Before SBO – After SBO” tabulates that Single-Business-Once firms 
demonstrate the lowest corporate diversification performance with a statistically significant 
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excess value of -6.9% (p-value < 0.01); hence, providing support for H1a. Row (X): “Before 
SMBM – After SMBM” tabulates that Single/Multi-Business-Many firms demonstrate the 
highest corporate diversification performance with a statistically significant excess value of 
5.2% (p-value < 0.05); hence, providing support for H1b. Row (VII): “Before MBO – After 
MBO” documents that Multi-Business-Once firms have zero excess value; therefore they 
demonstrate higher corporate diversification performance from Single-Business-Once (SBO) 
firms and lower corporate diversification performance from Single/Multi-Business-Many 
(SMBM) firms; hence, supporting H1c. 
Finally, regression model (3) in Table 6 investigates the second hypothesis (H2) 
according to which firms’ show  higher valuation when they diversify through internal 
growth than acquisition. Specifically, the model employs dummy variables to segregate the 
effects of After Diversification between internal growth (After DC * No ACQ) and 
acquisitions (After DC * ACQ), where “ACQ” takes the value of one if diversification is 
through acquisition and zero otherwise, and “No ACQ” takes the value of one if 
diversification is through internal growth and zero otherwise. The empirical evidence 
supports H2 since  diversifications through internal growth demonstrate an excess value of -
7.2% which is significantly higher than the excess value of diversification through 
acquisitions which is -22.3%.  
  Regression model (6) elaborates further on the results of model (3) and segregates 
the valuation effect of diversification depending of the mode of diversification across the 
three diversification profiles. Assessing the overall evidence of regression model (6) from the 
lower part of Table 6, diversification through internal growth always bears higher valuations 
than diversification through acquisitions. For instance, row (V): “Before SBO – After SBO * 
No ACQ” demonstrates that Single-Business-Once firms that diversify through internal 
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growth demonstrate an excess value of -6.4% which is much higher than the excess value of  
-16.9% when these firms diversify through acquisitions as shown in row (VI): “Before SBO – 
After SBO * ACQ”. Similar conclusions prevail for the Multi-Business-Once (rows (VIII) 
and (IX)) and Single/Multi-Business-Many (rows (XI) and (XII)) firms.  In addition, the 
analysis expands model (6) to capture valuation effects by segregating between related and 
unrelated acquisitions (see results in Section A in the online Appendix). Findings show that 
Single-Business-Once firms that diversify by choosing to expand through unrelated 
acquisitions create excess value relative to firms in the same profile that choose to expand 
through related acquisitions, which is the same line with previous findings (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999). 
5.4. Additional analysis 
 This study investigates the sensitivity of the findings to alternative model 
specifications. First, prior literature conjectures that the diversification discount arises from, 
among other things, agency problems, such as empire building (Houston, James, and 
Ryngaert, 2001), managerial overconfidence (Andreou et al., 2014), and risk reduction 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981). Focusing on corporate governance to measure potential agency 
problems, Hoechle et al. (2012) find that 25–30% of the diversification discount relates to 
poor corporate governance structure. In addition, imperfections in the external market and 
product/labor markets would make a diversification strategy more attractive. Yet, the 
attractiveness of such strategy should dissipate over time as market-oriented institutional 
transitions unfold (Lee, Peng, and Lee, 2008). If either the quality of corporate governance or 
institutional transitions relates to organizational learning in strategic settings such as 
corporate diversification, then the relation between diversification profiles and firm value 
could be an artifact of the quality of corporate governance and/or institutional transitions and 
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not necessarily of organizational learning. While the inclusion of lagged excess values in the 
regression analysis of Table 6 should mitigate such omitted variable bias problems, this study 
assesses the robustness of the results using: (i) the Gompers–Ishii–Metrick (2003), or GIM 
index, as a proxy of the quality of corporate governance, and (ii) the ratio of market 
capitalization to the gross domestic product (CAP/GDP) as a proxy for institutional 
transitions (Lee et al., 2008; Levine, 1997). The results from regression models (1) and (2) of 
Table 7 show that the GIM index is not statistically significant while CAP/GDP is negative 
and significant. However, the relation between diversification profiles and firm value still 
persists as in Table 6. Additional analysis, in Section B of the online Appendix, reveals that, 
without including lagged excess values, poor corporate governance relates in a negative 
fashion to excess value, consistent with the finding of Hoechle et al. (2012). By including 
both lagged excess values and corporate governance index simultaneously into the regression 
analysis, the governance index becomes statistically insignificant, thus supporting the 
argument that lagged excess values mitigate omitted variable bias concerns. 
Second, the study also investigates the sensitivity of the findings to the inclusion of 
non-US firms in the sample. Different levels of globalization and competition are significant 
factors that influence the degree, scope, and performance of corporate diversification 
(Wiersema and Bowen, 2008). Along this line, Lins and Servaes (1999) find significant 
differences in the diversification discount between countries with different institutional 
frameworks. Even though discount/premium varies across different institutional contexts and 
thus across countries of incorporation, whether or not different institutional contexts relate to 
diversification profiles is unclear. Nevertheless, the study presents results after excluding 
1,486 non-US firms with 6,722 firm–year observations from the analysis. Regression model 
(3) in Table 7 presents the results. Overall, the results across diversification profiles remain 
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similar to those of Table 6. Nevertheless, results from the same analysis for non-US firms 
only are not significant (see results in Section C in the online Appendix). This evidence may 
indicate that non-US firms are a special group of companies that as part of the US stock 
exchanges mainly as American Depository Receipts (ADRs) preserve certain characteristics 
such as larger size.  
Finally, the study also investigates whether organizational learning relates to the 
diversity of a firm’s business and affects firm value within each diversification profile. The 
firm’s business diversity may be value detrimental from some point and onwards by 
impeding the learning ability of a firm to effectively codify valuable new knowledge into 
systems, routines, and procedures due to the increasing complexity of the business structure. 
To this end, the study uses a sales SIC-based entropy index to measure the firm’s business 
diversity. The analysis expands regression model (1) in Table 6 to include the interaction 
term of After DC with the entropy index and the model also includes the entropy index as 
control variable. Further, to estimate a nonlinear entropy specification that captures 
diminishing effects of organizational learning due to increasing business diversity, another 
model also includes the interaction of After DC with the squared term of entropy and also 
includes this term as control variable. Finally, the study estimates both of these model 
specifications per diversification profile. Regression results that are available in Section D in 
the online Appendix show no statistical power to support the case that diversity of a firm’s 
businesses affects diversification performance. These findings are not surprising because if 
diversification profiles reflect different capacities of repetitive and/or accumulative 
organizational learning, as the study claims, and given that organizational learning depends 
on the diversity of a firm’s businesses, then the variation of entropy index within each profile 
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should be smaller, something that explains the absence of a significant impact of entropy on 
diversification performance.  
Table 7 here. 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
This study seeks to further investigate the proposition that corporate diversification 
destroys shareholder value. The study draws  on the absorptive capacity viewpoint of 
organizational learning to  suggest that some firms may perform better in their diversification 
programs than other due to their higher level of repetitive and accumulative diversification 
experience (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, and Davison, 2009; Laamanen and 
Keil, 2008). The study investigates the performance of three diversification profiles that 
capture different levels of diversification-related experience using information throughout the 
entire period of investigation rather than information from each diversification event 
separately. This approach helps to avoid mixing together the impact of organizational 
learning during the periods before and after a decision to diversify. The results show a value 
discount only in single-business firms that diversify once. In contrast, firms with two or more 
diversifications achieve value premiums instead. These firms develop competence in the 
process of carrying out such corporate actions. Naturally, the repetitive pursue of diversifying 
decisions refines these competences to further enhance economies of scope, which translates 
into greater firm value. In that respect, firms that engage in multiple diversification actions 
should possess greater experience at integrating the different resources, such as 
manufacturing, transportation, distribution, and, capabilities in communication, coordination 
and cost management of their different business units (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991a). In 
addition, these firms operate in multiple-business segment structures, and as such, they 
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develop specialist skills to exploit commonalities among businesses which they may 
successfully apply to new diversifications (Hayward, 2002). This may balance out the 
additional administration costs from adding a new business (Aktas et al., 2013). Finally, 
multi-business firms that diversify once do not experience any adverse value effects 
indicating that they perform better than single-business firms that diversify once. This finding 
is in line with the practitioner's view suggesting that prior experience in managing a multi-
business firm eliminates the adverse effect of corporate diversification (e.g., Heuskel, 
Fechtel, and Beckmann, 2006; Shulman, 1999). Overall, findings are in the same spirit with 
previous studies of corporate learning supporting that firms with higher levels of experience 
use their resources more effectively when pursue corporate actions to enhance synergies and 
innovation than firms having less experience (Bergh and Lim, 2008; Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Lane et al., 2001). 
In addition, findings show that firms using internal growth to diversify demonstrate 
higher valuations rather firms that pursue (resource extending) acquisitions, which supports 
the perspective that the relatedness of a new business facilitates the application of learning to 
reduce costs and raise innovation. These findings are in the same line of reasoning with 
studies suggesting that every additional non-core business adds to administrative costs and 
complexity since the firm cannot apply their knowledge efficiently to integrate the new 
business to their organization (Barkema and Schijven, 2008b; Finkelstein and Haleblian, 
2002; Hayward, 2002). Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) are the first to suggest and find a U-
shape relationship as they argue that acquiring firms with rather low experience apply in an 
inappropriate fashion the experience coming from the first acquisitions to subsequent 
dissimilar acquisitions. In addition, the authors find that the more similar the acquisition 
targets to prior targets, the better they perform. Despite the recognition in the literature that 
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related experiences help the firm apply their stock of knowledge more effectively most 
acquisition studies do not distinguish among resource related/unrelated acquisitions. This 
omission may contribute to the ambivalent empirical results in this stream of research 
(Barkema and Schijven, 2008a). This study investigates a setting of resource extending 
acquisitions, that display low resource commonality, and distinguishes the negative influence 
of acquisitions on firm diversification performance.  
This study makes a number of contributions. This study applies the absorptive 
capacity viewpoint of organizational learning to explain valuation effects of corporate 
diversification strategies that capture different degrees of accumulative and repetitive 
experience. Previous studies investigate the diversification performance by identifying the 
effects of economic factors, such as information asymmetries and operational complexity, 
however these studies do not distinguish between different diversification postures (Berger 
and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994). Findings suggest that only single-business firms that 
diversify once destroy shareholder value indicating in this way that a firm’s ability to develop 
absorptive capacity is an important determinant of diversification performance. Specifically, 
this study accentuates the idea that the cognition and experience that result from 
organizations engaging in repetitive diversification decisions and/or having experience with 
multiple business operations within a diversified structure facilitate execution effectiveness, 
which helps firms reduce any subsequent diversification mistakes that could otherwise harm 
firm value. Overall, the empirical findings add to the corporate diversification literature (Hitt 
et al., 1994; Hitt et al., 1997; Tallman and Li, 1996; Qian, 2002; Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur, 
1998) as the study suggests that organizational learning, a cognitive and behavioral 
perspective is an important antecedent of corporate diversification performance. 
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The empirical findings also add to the literature of organizational learning in the 
context of corporate strategy as the study finds varying performance across diversification 
profiles and acknowledges that researchers should consider the firm’s complete 
diversification program rather than individual acts of diversification. Only recently scholars 
recognize that acquisitions are elements of a broader program which encompasses a sequence 
of events with certain frequency, and that, the characteristics of an acquisition program 
influence acquisition performance (Barkema and Schijven, 2008b; Laamanen and Keil, 
2008). The use of diversification profiles to capture the different levels of experience is an 
additional contribution to the literature since the study directly associates the firm’s 
diversification program with their repetitive and accumulative experience.               
 The findings of the study have implications for managers as well, since they provide 
insights on how firms should design a corporate diversification strategy that creates value. 
Firms achieve value by gaining experience from repetitive diversifications and from 
operating in a diversified structure. Theoretical developments suggest that firms develop 
absorptive capacity by codifying knowledge into processes and systems and use this 
capability to raise synergies and innovation (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Therefore, creating 
systems that actively identify, transfer, store and use new knowledge to improve practices 
and take better decisions may increase the benefits from experience accumulation. In 
addition, this study confirms the findings of previous studies that internal growth 
diversifications result in better performance than acquisitions, and re-iterates that new 
diversification experience is more productive when relates to the firm’s knowledge stock 
(Hayward, 2002; Tanriverdi and Venkatraman, 2005). 
This study is not without weaknesses. First, the sample consists entirely of US listed 
firms with more than 70% of observation referring to firms with headquarters in the US; this 
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may limit the generalizability of the findings outside the US. Learning is context specific, and 
therefore, firms assimilate diversification experience at different degrees depending on 
different factors, such as national culture. For example, firms operating in individualistic 
societies (Hofstede, 1980) may face difficulty to share internally new knowledge, which may 
hamper their ability to assimilate knowledge to enhance organizational learning. Second, 
administrative heritage and culture may facilitate how firms learn and apply the value of new 
knowledge to commercial ends. Although the study controls for the firms’ organizational 
structure using a sales entropy index and for the quality of corporate governance using the 
GIM index, such variables may not be the best choice to control for the firms’ administrative 
heritage and culture. Yet, lack of data does not allow the study to control explicitly for such 
firm environmental factors. Finally, the study uses archive data that do not reveal insights 
about  the exact learning mechanisms, such as storage and retrieval of knowledge, and how 
firms apply them to create value through diversification. Given that most studies use a similar 
methodology to examine the relationship of experience with corporate strategies and firm 
performance (Haleblian, et al., 2009), future research may seek to develop a deeper 
understanding of diversification decisions and the underpinning learning processes by 
pursuing in-depth longitudinal studies in different geographic regions.  
Future studies of diversification performance may consider characteristics of the 
process of implementing a diversification program, such as the rate and sequence of corporate 
actions, since previous studies on acquisitions find that these attributes could influence the 
firm’s organizational learning in both directions; organizations can build relevant experiences 
or organizations can create  situations where they cannot digest experiences (Barkema and 
Schijven, 2008b; Laamanen and Keil, 2008; Nadolska and Barkema, 2014; Shi and Prescott, 
2011). For example, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) argue that to benefit from acquisitions 
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a firm may need to pursue several acquisitions so that they develop adequate experience to 
determine dissimilarities between them.   
 In conclusion, this study provides further insight into the diversification discount 
debate by finding evidence that the diversification discount is not universal but rather affects 
single-business firms that diversify once. In addition, firms that pursue internal growth 
diversifications perform better than firms that pursue acquisitions. Finally, the absorptive 
capacity viewpoint of organizational learning depicts that repetitive and accumulative 
experience helps the firm to recognize, assimilate and use new knowledge to improve future 
decision-making support these findings.  
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   Table 1 
    Definitions, measurement of variables and databases 
Variables Definitions 
Dependent variable  
EXC_VAL Excess value is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the firm’s market 
value to the imputed value. Market value is the sum of the market value 
of equity and the book value of debt (Compustat Industrial Annual). The 
imputed value is the sum of the segments’ imputed values, obtained by 
multiplying each segment’s sales with the median of the market value-
to-sales ratio computed using only single-business firms in the same 
industry (Compustat Industrial Segment).  
Diversification and profiles related variables (from Compustat Industrial Segment)  
DCY A dummy that equals one for each year the firm operates in multiple 
business segments and zero otherwise. 
DC A dummy that equals one if the firm diversifies and zero otherwise. 
Before DC A dummy that equals one for the years before a firm diversifies for the 
first time and zero otherwise. 
After DC A dummy that equals one for all years following the first instance of 
diversification and zero otherwise. 
SBO Single-Business-Once firms that diversify once from one-business to 
multiple-business segments.  
Before SBO A dummy that equals one for the years before a SBO firm diversifies for 
the first time and zero otherwise.  
After SBO A dummy that equals one for all years following the first instance of 
diversification for a SBO firm and zero otherwise. 
MBO Multi-Business-Once firms that diversify once from multiple-business 
segments to multiple-business segments.  
Before MBO A dummy that equals one for the years before a MBO firm diversifies 
for the first time and zero otherwise.  
After MBO A dummy that equals one for all years following the first instance of 
diversification for a MBO firm and zero otherwise. 
SMBM Single/Multi-Business-Many (SMBM) firms that diversify multiple-
times.  
Before SMBM A dummy that equals one for the years before a SMBM firm diversifies 
for the first time and zero otherwise.  
After SMBM A dummy that equals one for all years following the first instance of 
diversification for a SMBM firm and zero otherwise. 
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Other variables  
ACQ A dummy that equals one if diversification profile contains at least one 
acquisition that coincides with an increase in the (i) number of business 
segments and (ii) firm sales of 5%, and zero otherwise. (Combination of 
Securities Data Corporation database and Compustat Industrial Segment)  
No ACQ A dummy that equals one if diversification profile does not contain any 
acquisition that creates an increase in the number of business segments, 
and zero otherwise. (Combination of Securities Data Corporation 
database and Compustat Industrial Segment) 
GIM The Gompers–Ishii–Metrick (2003) proxy of the quality of corporate 
governance. From Andrew Metric website.  
CAP/GDP Ratio of market capitalization to the gross domestic product. (hand 
collected data) 
Control variables (from Compustat Industrial Annual) 
TA Total assets in USD millions. 
SALES Sales in USD millions. 
SIZE Log of total assets to measure firm size. 
SIZE-SQ Squared term of SIZE. 
EBIT/SALES Earnings before interest and taxes over sales to measure profitability. 
CAPX/SALES Capital expenditures over sales to measure investments. 
LEV Ratio of long-term debt to total assets to measure leverage. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of single-business and diversified firms 
 
 
Firm-
years 
Number of 
Firms 
Firms that diversify 5,803 1,168 
   Single-business firms that diversify once (Single-Business-Once) 2,637 565 
   Multi-business firms that diversify once (Multi-Business-Once) 1,535 313 
   Single/multi-business firms that diversify multiple times (Single/Multi-Business-Many) 1,631 290 
   
Multiple-business firms that do not change the number of segments (all-time diversified firms with constant 
number of business segments throughout the period) 
795 290 
Single-business firms 19,398 4,222 
Total 25,996 5,680 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics by diversification profile  
This table presents summary statistics for single-business firms and for the three diversification profiles before the first incidence of diversification. Total assets (TA) and sales (SALES) are measured in USD millions, 
investments (CAPX/SALES) is the ratio of capital expenditures to total sales, profitability (EBIT/SALES) is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total sales and leverage (LEV) is the ratio of total debt to 
total assets. *, ** and *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively (in each case, the mean value comparisons are with respect to mean values of single-business firms). 
 TA SALES  CAPX/SALES EBIT/SALES LEV (Debt/Assets) 
 
Mean 
Median 
N 
Mean 
Median 
N 
Mean 
Median 
N 
Mean 
Median 
N 
Mean 
Median 
N 
Firms that diversify 
1,573 
298*** 
2,403 
1,463 
283*** 
2,403 
0.11*** 
0.04 
2,403 
0.05*** 
0.07*** 
2,403 
0.24 
0.20 
2,403 
   Single-business firms that diversify once (Single-Business-Once) 
1,093*** 
262* 
1,491 
1,049*** 
250*** 
1,491 
0.12** 
0.04 
1,491 
0.04** 
0.07*** 
1,491 
0.23** 
0.17* 
1,491 
   Multi-business firms that diversify once (Multi-Business-Once) 
2,786* 
289*** 
465 
2,751 
337*** 
465 
0.08*** 
0.04** 
465 
0.06*** 
0.07 
465 
0.26 
0.26*** 
465 
   Single/multi-business firms that diversify multiple times (Single/Multi-Business- 
   Many) 
1,911 
454*** 
447 
1,502 
396*** 
447 
0.10*** 
0.05** 
447 
0.09*** 
0.09*** 
447 
0.24 
0.23 
447 
      
Single-business firms 
1,445 
223 
19,398 
1,247 
192 
19,398 
0.14 
0.04 
19,398 
0.02 
0.06 
19,398 
0.25 
0.19 
19,398 
 
  
 
 
Table 4 
Diversification profiles and acquisition characteristics  
This table presents information on the characteristics of acquisitions by diversification profile.  
 
 
No. of completed 
acquisitions 
Withdrawn 
acquisitions 
Acquisitions 
duration (days) 
Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CARs) (%) 
 Mean % Mean Mean 
Single-business firms that diversify once (Single-
Business-Once) 
0.242 62.30 90.75 -0.042 
Multi-business firms that diversify once (Multi-
Business-Once) 
0.759 52.50 54.16 -0.075 
Single/multi-business firms that diversify 
multiple times (Single/Multi-Business-Many) 
1.628 9.90 40.53 1.647 
 
  
 
 
Table 5 
 
Panel A: Correlations 
 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal. *, ** and *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.  
 
 EXC_VAL DCY SIZE CAPX/SALES EBIT/SALES LEV 
EXC_VAL  -0.037*** 0.243*** 0.209*** 0.284*** -0.056*** 
DCY -0.036***  0.093*** -0.065*** 0.029*** 0.038*** 
SIZE 0.232*** 0.093***  0.271*** 0.351*** 0.231*** 
CAPX/SALES 0.127*** -0.075*** 0.120***  0.222*** 0.126*** 
EBIT/SALES 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.186*** 0.042***  0.019*** 
LEV -0.011* 0.057 0.108*** 0.092*** -0.033***  
 
Panel B: Estimation of the diversification discount 
 
This table reports regression coefficient estimates of the corporate diversification discount for the period 1998-2008. The dependent variable 
is Excess Value (EXC_VAL). t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient. *, ** and *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
of significance, respectively. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Full Sample Excluding Refocusing Firms 
Const. 
-0.446*** 
(-43.95) 
-0.969*** 
(-37.31) 
-0.489*** 
(-37.81) 
-1.001*** 
(-29.63) 
DCY 
-0.085*** 
(-12.98) 
-0.080*** 
(-12.61) 
-0.077*** 
(-8.17) 
-0.068*** 
(-7.42) 
SIZE 
0.069*** 
(41.88) 
0.546*** 
(46.08) 
0.080*** 
(36.33) 
0.580*** 
(38.35) 
CAPX/SALES 
0.234*** 
(20.63) 
0.124*** 
(10.98) 
0.192*** 
(15.84) 
0.089*** 
(7.38) 
EBIT/SALES 
-0.012 
(1.27) 
-0.040*** 
(-3.91) 
-0.000 
(-0.02) 
-0.051*** 
(-4.38) 
SIZE lag1 
 -0.176*** 
(-13.94) 
 -0.196*** 
(-12.94) 
CAPX/SALES lag1 
 0.002* 
(1.78) 
 0.001 
(1.55) 
EBIT/SALES lag1 
 0.000 
(0.76) 
 0.000 
(0.58) 
SIZE lag2 
 -0.129*** 
(-17.32) 
 -0.128*** 
(-14.57) 
CAPX/SALES lag2 
 0.000* 
(1.87) 
 0.000* 
(1.91) 
EBIT/SALES lag2 
 -0.000 
(-0.34) 
 -0.000 
(-0.15) 
LEV 
 -0.002 
(-0.19) 
 -0.016 
(-1.39) 
SIZE-SQ 
 -0.013*** 
(-20.80) 
 -0.014*** 
(-15.84) 
No of observations 39,134 39,134 25,996 25,996 
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.116 0.065 0.123 
 
  
 
 
Table 6 
Time-series analysis of the impact of corporate diversification on firm value 
 
This table reports regression coefficient estimates of the corporate diversification discount for the period 1998-2008. The dependent variable 
is Excess Value (EXC_VAL). t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient. *, ** and *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
of significance, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -0.971*** 
(-15.31) 
-0.965*** 
(-15.24) 
-0.965*** 
(-15.22) 
-0.964*** 
(-15.22) 
-0.190*** 
(-5.26) 
-0.191*** 
(-5.27) 
DC -0.040** 
(-2.23) 
     
Before DC  0.014 
(0.64) 
0.000 
(0.07) 
   
After DC  -0.077*** 
(-3.62) 
    
After DC *  
No ACQ 
  -0.072*** 
(-2.71) 
   
After DC *  
ACQ 
  -0.223*** 
(-2.84) 
   
Before SBO    0.034 
(1.22) 
0.022* 
(1.78) 
0.023* 
(1.78) 
After SBO    -0.097*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.047** 
(-2.73) 
 
After SBO * No 
ACQ 
     -0.041** 
(-2.32) 
After SBO * 
ACQ 
     -0.146* 
(-1.87) 
Before MBO    -0.018 
(-0.42) 
-0.013 
(-0.60) 
-0.014 
(-0.61) 
After MBO    -0.083** 
(-2.28) 
-0.021 
(-1.38) 
 
After MBO * No 
ACQ 
     -0.019 
(-1.27) 
After MBO * 
ACQ 
     -0.135 
(-1.25) 
Before SMBM    -0.022 
(-0.55) 
-0.046** 
(-2.58) 
-0.047*** 
(-2.60) 
After SMBM    -0.052 
(-1.47) 
0.006 
(0.37) 
 
After SMBM * 
No ACQ 
     0.007 
(0.44) 
After SMBM * 
ACQ 
     -0.033 
(-0.38) 
ACQ   0.067 
(1.28) 
  0.006 
(0.13) 
Control 
variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lag1 EXC_VAL No No No No Yes Yes 
Lag2 EXC_VAL No No No No Yes Yes 
       
 t-statistics to check the difference between “Before” and “After” diversification events 
(I) 
Before DC – 
After DC 
 -0.092*** 
(-3.61) 
    
(II) 
Before DC – 
After DC * No 
ACQ 
  -0.072*** 
(-2.71) 
   
(III) 
Before DC – 
After DC *ACQ 
  -0.223*** 
(-2.84) 
   
(IV) 
Before SBO – 
After SBO 
   -0.131*** 
(-3.61) 
-0.069*** 
(-3.36) 
 
(V) 
Before SBO – 
     -0.064*** 
(-3.01) 
  
 
 
After SBO * No 
ACQ 
(VI) 
Before SBO – 
After SBO * 
ACQ 
     -0.169** 
(-2.14) 
(VII) 
Before MBO – 
After MBO 
   -0.065 
(-1.38) 
-0.007 
(-0.31) 
 
(VIII) 
Before MBO – 
After MBO * No 
ACQ 
     -0.005 
(-0.22) 
(IX) 
Before MBO – 
After MBO * 
ACQ 
     -0.121 
(-1.14) 
(X) 
Before SMBM – 
After SMBM 
   -0.031 
(-0.69) 
0.052** 
(2.27) 
 
(XI) 
Before SMBM – 
After SMBM * 
No ACQ 
     0.054** 
(2.32) 
(XII) 
Before SMBM – 
After SMBM * 
ACQ 
     0.014 
(0.16) 
No of 
observations 
25,996 25,996 25,996 25,996 21,544 21,544 
R2 0.127 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.584 0.584 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 7 
Time-series analysis of the impact of corporate diversification on firm value: Additional control variables 
This table reports regression coefficient estimates of the corporate diversification discount for the period 1998-2008. The dependent variable 
is Excess Value (EXC_VAL). t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient. *, ** and *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
of significance, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Constant -0.001 
(-0.01) 
-0.099** 
(-2.32) 
-0.172 
(-3.93) 
Before SBO 0.005 
(0.24) 
0.022* 
(1.78) 
0.017 
(1.22) 
After SBO -0.071** 
(-2.20) 
-0.047*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.073*** 
(-3.96) 
Before MBO 0.002 
(0.07) 
-0.013 
(-0.60) 
-0.028 
(-1.15) 
After MBO -0.029 
(-1.21) 
-0.021 
(-1.38) 
-0.039** 
(-2.33) 
Before SMBM -0.015 
(-0.53) 
-0.046*** 
(-2.58) 
-0.046** 
(-2.37) 
After SMBM -0.026 
(-1.39) 
0.006 
(0.37) 
-0.005 
(-0.30) 
GIM -0.001 
(-0.44) 
  
MCAP/GDP  -0.111*** 
(-5.20) 
 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Lag1 EXC_VAL Yes Yes Yes 
Lag2 EXC_VAL Yes Yes Yes 
Difference 
Before SBO – After SBO 
-0.077** 
(-2.07) 
-0.069*** 
(-3.36) 
-0.091*** 
(-4.05) 
Difference 
Before MBO – After MBO 
-0.031 
(-0.86) 
-0.008 
(-0.31) 
-0.011 
(-0.41) 
Difference 
Before SMBM – After SMBM 
-0.011 
(-0.35) 
0.053** 
(2.27) 
0.042* 
(1.64) 
No of observations 4,752 21,544 15,976 
R2 0.616 0.584 0.577 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1 
The theoretical and empirical setting of the study 
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